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After the calamitous events of 2007-8, US regulators appear to have taken for 
granted that central banks’ “lifeboats” of insolvent financial institutions are necessarily a bad 
thing. This paper argues that such an assumption might be wrong. According to the authors, it 
is possible to single out at least one historical episode – the 1889 bailout of Comptoir 
d’Escompte (CdE) by Banque de France (BdF) – showing that “good” lifeboats may exist. In 
their view, this bailout was a success because it allowed for an orderly management of the 
troubles of a systemically important financial institution (SIFI) while providing the right 
incentives to prevent the rise of moral hazard. 
The authors must be praised for bringing back to our attention this very interesting 
episode, which is perfectly representative of the difficulties and ambiguities inherent to the 
evaluation of lifeboats. What do the French events of 1889 actually tell us about this kind of 
intervention? 
 
1) Bagehot on the Continent? 
According to Bagehot (1873), lending of last resort (LoLR) is a synonym for 
support to the money market, aimed at protecting the payments system. In Bagehot’s view, the 
central bank’s reaction to a crisis should merely consist of the continuation of ordinary 
standing-facility lending on a much grander scale (Bignon, Flandreau and Ugolini 2012). 
Maintaining such a stance allows the monetary authority to remain – in Giannini’s (1999) 
words – “enemy of none but a common friend of all”: as a matter of fact, providing market 
support along pre-established rules is a policy that is supposed to be neutral with respect to 
money market participants. Conversely, support to specific money market institutions is 
explicitly ruled out by Bagehot (1873, p. 104) on the grounds that ‘any aid to a present bad 
bank is the surest mode of preventing the establishment of a future good bank’ – meaning that 
bailouts always engender socially undesirable distributional effects (from the good to the 
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bad). For instance, the Bank of England (BoE) really abided by Bagehotian rules in 1866 
(when it supported the money market while letting Overend-Gurney fail), but not so in 1890 
(when it set up a bailout of insolvent Baring Bros: Flandreau and Ugolini 2014). There is no 
doubt that BdF’s reaction to the 1889 crisis belonged to the sort of operations Bagehot would 
have disapproved of. 
If one is to justify resorting to a lifeboat, then, the powerful case made by Lombard 
Street against this type of intervention needs to be addressed specifically. First, one must 
show that ordinary LoLR would not be enough to prevent the default of the given institution 
from generating large negative externalities on the payments system. Second, one must 
demonstrate that the operation is designed so as to offset all obnoxious distributional effects. 
As we shall see, both propositions are indeed difficult to prove. 
 
2) Rescuing a Systemically Important Bank? 
Since 2008, academics and policymakers alike have struggled hard to understand 
what a SIFI actually is and how to recognize it. The issue is of the utmost importance, as 
systemicness is an argument that may be unduly brandished by interested parties lobbying for 
subsidies during a crisis. How can central bankers know whether a lifeboat is really 
indispensable in order to prevent money market dislocations? Unfortunately, no consensus 
has yet emerged on how to address this thorny question. To date, mainly two different 
approaches have been adopted. The first one focuses on destructive potential: systemicness is 
seen here as directly proportional to the negative externalities engendered by an eventual 
failure. The alternative approach focuses on replaceability: in this context, systemicness is 
interpreted as inversely proportional to the financial system’s capability of finding substitutes 
to the failing institutions (Bongini and Nieri 2014). In the absence of a clear-cut methodology 
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for measuring whether CdE really was a SIFI, it might be useful to try to estimate its degree 
of systemicness by both yardsticks. 
As far as destructive potential is concerned, an obvious indicator is market 
capitalization. At the beginning of 1889, CdE was France’s third biggest joint-stock bank 
(BdF excluded) and the twelfth company by market capitalization. This may have provided 
the case for central bank support. In 1882, however, Union Générale (UG), France’s biggest 
joint-stock bank (BdF excluded) and the sixth company by market capitalization, had not been 
deemed large enough for justifying a lifeboat.2 On that occasion, BdF had formally abided by 
Bagehotian principles: it had let UG go bust and provided market support by discounting 
eligible paper to eligible counterparties, thus preventing a meltdown of the payments system 
(White 2007).3 Of course, it might be possible that the long-term effects of the 1882 crisis had 
made central bankers change their mind about lifeboats in the meantime. As far as we know, 
however, BdF never regretted not having rescued UG. In any case, it seems difficult to argue 
that a collapse of CdE in 1889 would have had more destructive potential than that of UG in 
1882, in the event of which the French payments system did not eventually collapse (except 
for one provincial bourse, which was closed down). 
Size may not be a good indicator of systemicness, as relatively small institutions 
sometimes happen to play a very crucial role for money market functioning because of their 
irreplaceability. That was the case, for instance, of Baring Bros in 1890: the merchant bank 
was a major issuer of the standard money market instruments of the time (i.e. acceptances), 
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 I warmly thank David Le Bris for generously sharing this information from the database he has assembled. It 
must be acknowledged that UG’s capitalization was severely inflated by the fact that nearly one-third of its 
equity had not actually been issued (White 2007). The fact remains, however, that in 1882 UG was remarkably 
bigger than any other French bank except BdF, while in 1889 the size of CdE was lesser than that of Crédit 
Foncier and roughly in line with that of its three main competitors (Crédit Lyonnais, Paribas, and Société 
Générale). 
3
 White (2007) talks about a “bailout of the Paris bourse” by BdF after UG’s crash. Unlike in 1889, however, 
BdF did not engage in non-statutory operations in 1882. In fact, it was a syndicate of bankers who formally 
bailed out the bourse; bankers were then able to refinance themselves through the central bank by originating 
paper eligible for discount. It would be interesting to understand why this apparently efficient solution, which 
did not infringe upon BdF’s statutes, was not taken into consideration when the rescue of CdE was designed. 
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and its default would have put the English payments system into disarray (Flandreau and 
Ugolini 2014). And in fact, the London interbank market reacted nervously to rumors about 
Barings’ difficulties, and really panicked when the  prospect of a default materialized; as soon 
as the BoE set up a lifeboat, however, trust recovered and interbank rates went down.4 No 
such signs of nervousness could be observed, on the contrary, in 1889 Paris: before and after 
the outburst of CdE’s crisis, interbank rates remained more or less flat and well below the 
central bank’s standing facility rate, as if nothing serious had been happening in the meantime 
(see below, figure 1). 5  As a matter of fact, unlike Barings, CdE was not an important 
originator of money market instruments. In its 1888 end-of-year balance sheet, the French 
joint-stock bank displayed less than fr.33m outstanding acceptances out of total fr.381m 
liabilities.6  By contrast, in 1890, Barings’ lightly capitalized partnership had outstanding 
acceptances for around £15m (i.e. nearly fr.378m: Chapman 1984, p. 121): even correcting 
for the larger size of the London money market with respect to the Paris one, the orders of 
magnitude do not seem to be comparable. All this appears to suggest that CdE may not have 
been an irreplaceable player on the money market.7  Unlike in the case of Barings (and 
Lehman), troubles generated by a CdE default could perhaps have been expected to not spread 
all around the payments system, but to remain confined to some specific subsectors of the 
national financial system. 
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 This is the opposite of what happened with Lehman Bros: in fall 2008, interbank rates remained flat in the 
weeks preceding the crisis and skyrocketed afterwards. As Lehman and Barings were both SIFIs, such different 
patterns are probably explained by differing market expectations. In all likelihood, the bailout of Barings had not 
been anticipated in 1890 (as no such interventions had ever been put in place by the BoE), while that of Lehman 
had been incorrectly anticipated in 2008 (as a number of financial institutions had already been rescued in the 
preceding months). 
5
 Note that in the 19th century central banks typically did not implement money market operations in order to 
steer interbank rates (although with some exceptions: Jobst and Ugolini 2014). As a result, the spread between 
the interbank rate and the central bank’s standing facility rate can be taken as an indicator of money market 
pressure (Bignon, Flandreau and Ugolini 2012). 
6
 Le Figaro, Supplément littéraire du dimanche, February 24, 1889. 
7
 An alternative explanation might be that the bailout of CdE was indeed correctly anticipated by money market 
participants. Besides being ungrounded by historical evidence, such an explanation would be at odds with the 
authors’ argument that BdF was acting in order to avoid moral hazard. 
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On the eve of its collapse, a number of contemporaries warned of the systemicness 
of CdE. Yet their words cannot always be taken at face value, as observers may have been 
either ill-informed or concerned about its destructive potential for themselves (rather than for 
the whole payments system). Systemicness is indeed a very good argument to be brandished 
in order to invoke assistance from central bankers. Understanding whether similar claims are 
grounded is, however, a very delicate issue. One hundred and twenty-five years after its crisis, 
available evidence still does not establish conclusively whether CdE really was a SIFI or not. 
 
Figure 1 about here 
 
3) Can Moral Hazard Be Avoided? 
The possibility of being rescued by central bankers in case of crisis amounts to a 
sort of put option: once provided with such an option, financial institutions will expect to 
always receive assistance regardless of the quality of their assets. Of course, this is a 
considerable source of moral hazard. So then, the question is how to price the option high 
enough to eliminate perverse incentives. According to some (e.g. Calomiris 2011), no price 
would ever be really prohibitive: hence, the put should simply not exist. In contrast to this, the 
paper claims that a correct yet non-infinite price can be found for the put. In the authors’ 
view, the conditions attached to BdF’s lifeboat of CdE were harsh enough to offset all 
distributional effects. Their conclusion is that the absence of major banking shocks in France 
from 1890 to 1914 can be interpreted as evidence of the fact that BdF’s hawkish stance 
towards CdE did avoid the rise of moral hazard.8 
To show that misbehavior was severely sanctioned, the authors enumerate the 
punishments that were inflicted on the guilty. On the one hand, a number of people involved 
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 Of course, there might have been plenty of other reasons why France (like almost all European countries) did 
not experience any major domestic banking crash in the twenty-four years that preceded World War One. As the 
question is complex, it will be expedient not to venture into it here. 
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in the organization of the Copper Syndicate were subjected to pecuniary and nonpecuniary 
sanctions. These were mainly managers and directors of CdE and Société des Métaux (SdM), 
like Denfert-Rochereau (who lost his life), Secrétan (who lost his freedom), Hentsch (who 
lost his property), Tessionnière and Baudelot (who lost their posts), etc. On the other hand, 
the financial institutions involved in the funding of the corner were required to guarantee a 
fraction of the extraordinary loans extended by BdF to CdE, with a contribution proportional 
to their degree of involvement. While the first group paid quite dearly for their sins, the 
second group passed through the crisis fundamentally unscathed. Thanks to a quick recovery 
in the price of copper (and a little help from judges, who nullified many of CdE’s 
engagements), the bailed-out bank was able to repay all of its debts to BdF: as a result, 
members of the Guarantee Syndicate never had to pull a single coin out of their pockets in 
order to keep CdE afloat. This seems to imply that differential prices were fixed for the put 
option: some paid quite dearly, some others did not. Yet, it is still conceivable that these 
“personalized” prices had indeed been set correctly enough to offset all distributional effects 
and discourage the guilty from misbehaving again. What does historical evidence tell us about 
this? 
When CdE’s troubled situation was disclosed to the general public, allegations 
were made in Parliament and in the press concerning the dynamics of the crisis. It was said 
that the Copper Syndicate formed in 1887 was not a homogeneous crowd, but the merger of 
two interest groups whose strategies had been conflicting up to that moment. On the one 
hand, there was one interest group (we shall call it “group A”) who had been pursuing the 
plan of taking control of the demand side of the world copper market: it included SdM and its 
financial allies Hentsch, Paribas, and CdE. This is the network that is well visible in figure 5 
of the paper. On the other hand, there was another interest group (“group B”) who, on the 
contrary, had been trying to seize control of the supply side of the market: it included 
8 
Rothschilds, Société Générale, and a number of British investors. This network is not at all 
visible in figure 5, but it played a crucial role in the story. Although in 1887 the two groups 
had agreed to create the Copper Syndicate, in early 1888 members of B inexplicably refused 
to extend the loans they had promised to SdM. According to contemporaries, this move 
prompted rumors, weakened the whole plan, and forced Secrétan to recapitalize SdM in 
difficult circumstances. Group B then came back to the scheme and contributed to SdM’s 
recapitalization, but the situation was already compromised by then. When the crisis erupted, 
some members of A paid for it dearly, while members of B (some of whom were very 
influential in BdF) were only asked to contribute to the Guarantee Syndicate. In the long term, 
the crisis allowed B to seize full control of the world copper market by freeing it from A at no 
cost. 
These allegations were labelled as conspiracy theory at the time, but historians had 
to take them seriously. Gille (1968, pp. 56-60) wrote that available archival evidence allowed 
neither to prove nor to disprove them. However, Mollier (1991, pp. 291-306) discovered 
additional files that would rather appear to confirm them. In fact, since the early 1880s, 
members of group B had been building up a monopoly of copper mining around the world: 
this plan was finalized after CdE’s crisis, as we know for sure that a new Copper Syndicate 
was successfully set up in London in 1895 (Ferguson 1999, pp. 353-4). 
Although we are still unable to establish conclusively to what extent allegations 
corresponded to real facts, available evidence is enough for raising doubts about the neutrality 
of BdF’s intervention to rescue CdE. In fact, we cannot rule out the possibility that, far from 
discouraging the guilty from repeating their sins, the lifeboat engendered substantial 
distributional effects in favor of a few (i.e. members of group B, who supposedly free-rode on 
the Copper Syndicate in order to appropriate monopoly rents). This may not have been 
surprising in a world where central banks were controlled by private investors and hence, 
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prone to flagrant conflicts of interests. Even in a world where central bankers behave as social 
planners, however, designing lifeboats correctly may be an extremely difficult task. If nothing 
else, the above-mentioned evidence suggests that in order to assess all of the distributional 
effects engendered by a lifeboat, a lot of information may be required. Access to such a large 
amount of sensitive information may, however, often be unavailable to central bankers. Given 
this lack of information, setting the right price for the put option embedded in lifeboats might 
well be impossible. 
 
4) Sum-Up: Floating a “Lifeboat” (or Not)? 
This paper has the great merit of reviving the history of a lifeboat which, much 
more than other ones (e.g. BoE’s 1890 rescue of Baring Bros, that actually was a SIFI), 
confronts us with the dramatic ambiguities inevitably connected to this kind of intervention. 
The events of 1889 teach us at least two very important things. Firstly, evaluating whether a 
financial institution really is a SIFI is a much less straightforward task than it might appear at 
first sight: if assessing the degree of systemicness is a very tricky exercise ex-post, it will even 
more be so ex-ante. Secondly, offsetting the distributional effects (conducive to moral hazard) 
that are inherently linked to a lifeboat is an extremely complex issue, requiring access to 
private information that is hardly available to central bankers. All this suggests that additional 
investigation on the historical record of lifeboats might be needed in order to gain more 
positive lessons on how to deal with them. No doubt, this will be a promising avenue for 
research in the future. In the meantime, keeping a prudent stance towards the desirability of 
such intervention may not be a bad idea after all. 
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Figures 
 
 
Figure 1: Spreads between interbank rates and central bank’s standing facility rates during the CdE 
and Baring crises 
 
Source: Author’s computations on data from The Economist (1889-1891). 
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